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I 
 
Setting and Context 
 
Introduction 
 
The mere mentioning of “the Trans-Atlantic Relationship” generates a standard interpretation. 
Customary understanding claims that it is supposed to deal with the links between Europe and 
the United States (moderately expanded to include Canada, a country taken for granted). This is 
a view shared both in Brussels and Washington. This geographical concept very rarely refers to 
include the role of Mexico, for example. This “relationship” is never understood as triangular, 
formed  by  three  partners  (United  States/Canada,  Europe  and  Latin  America/Caribbean).  A 
quadrangular format, including Africa, is contemplated only in a bilateral sense (usually when 
one of the important partners (the United States or Europe) is considered as a protagonist. In 
sum, “Atlantis” (as an entity shared by all) is as mysterious and difficult to grasp as the myth of 
antiquity, as a problem that this volume surely tries to grasp and analysis. 
In any event, the evidence shows that the link between Europe (as such by itself or as 
European Union and some of its important states) and North America is incomplete without 
taking into account the existence and the role played, actively or passively, by the countries 
south from Rio Grande and Key West. In a planet that is already dominated by the heavily 
stereotyped  phenomenon  of    “globalization”  the  North-Atlantic  relationship  is  incomplete 
without the consideration of the action  south of U.S., in Latin America. This notion is even more 
acutely dramatized when considered within the bilateral relationships of Europe and the United 
States, separately, with Latin America/Caribbean. In both cases, the historical hegemons owe 
part of their global influence to their links established with the south. 
Focusing  on  the  subject  of  this  essay  (European-Latin  American  relations),  two 
outstanding dimensions deserve special attention not only for European and Latin American 
interests, but also because of their impact on the status of the North-South relationship in the 
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1 Gratitude is due to James Aggrey, Beverly Barrett, Maxime Larivé, María Lorca, and José Antonio 
Sanahuja for providing materials, editing assistance and organizing economic data. A handful of generous 
EU officials have provided facts, references and other details.   
   
2 Lic. Law, University of Barcelona, 1966; Ph.D, Georgetown University, 1973, is Jean Monnet Professor 
“ad personam” and Director of University of Miami European Union Center of Excellence. He has published 
over 200 academic articles and reviews, and he is the author or editor of 40 books. He also published over 
1,500 columns and essays. He was awarded the Encomienda of the Order of Merit by King Juan Carlos of 
Spain. 
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Americas. These two dimensions are the traditional axis formed by trade/investment/aid and the 
on-going  phenomena  of  regional  integration  and  diverse  economic  and  political  cooperation 
systems, the trade mark of the European Union (EU). Both angles were dramatized in the long 
preparations and implementation of the EU-Latin America/Caribbean summit that took place in 
Santiago, Chile, in January of 2013. This periodic (at two-three years intervals) gathering of the 
heads of government/states of both continents (the largest of summits only surpassed by the 
United Nations) has been setting the agenda for the economic, political and development aid 
agreements between both regions. These events have been also the scene of meditation about the 
state of the Latin American and Caribbean respective integration systems, with the EU as a point 
of reference, if not as an outright model. However, as we will see in the course of this essay, the 
economic crisis affecting Europe during most of the new century has exerted a negative impact 
on the EU-LA links. 
  The  future  of  the  relations  between  the  European  Union  and  Latin  America,  after  a 
hypothetical  additional  important  enlargement  in  the  rest  of  the  decade  of  2010-2020,  will 
depend on the confluence of at several factors necessary to accomplish a considerable change 
(positive of negative) from the current inertia. Some factors depend on the role Latin American 
governments, playing as agents, and the regional integration systems they have been developing. 
Other factors are located in Europe and its vicinity. While the Latin American factors are based 
on the will and success in completing the institutional framework of the integration entities, the 
European factors depend on the nature of the next enlargements, and the attitude of the main EU 
actors in shaping the new relationship. What will be the shape of Latin American integration in 
the next decade? How important will Latin America be for a newly refurbished Europe? How the 
economic crisis will affect the European-Latin American relationship. How external powers as 
China and the perennial presence of the United States will fill the vacuum left by a potentially 
weaken  Europe?  These  are  crucial  questions  to  be  answered,  or  at  least  to  be  taken  into 
consideration.  
On the other hand, Latin America has changed. It is not a solid bloc, with differences in 
the internal political and economic fabric of the countries. Their approaches to foreign policy are 
varied. Other foreign actors are now acting aggressively in the region (China). Attitudes towards 
regional integration are as many as the number of countries. Neo-populist regimes coexist with 
full democracies. Temptations of returning to authoritarian solutions are evident. Europe is seen 
in an ambivalent way. 
Europe has also changed. It is not the same as at the end of the Cold War, or the setting of 
the  Maastricht  Treaty  in  1992.  The  euro  and  internal  mobility  have  increased  the  pace  of 
integration. But the failure of the constitutional project in 2005 raised doubts in the nature of the 
process. The spectacular enlargement of 2004 modified the EU forever. All this, in addition to 
the  internal  shifts  in  Latin  America,  has  forced  observers  to  carry  out  new  analyses  on  the 
relationship between the two blocs, based on the tenets of the vanishing dictatorships of the 60s 
and 70s and part of the 80s, and the status of panacea that regional integration has enjoyed since 
then. Nonetheless, what still counts are the facts, mechanisms, and resources that dominate this 
relationship. We may then proceed to briefly speculate about its future.                               
 
 
The EU deals with Latin America 
 
The official portrait and story of today’s relations of the EU with Latin America boasts 
that for the last decade the two regions have regulated their diverse links through a formula 
known as “Strategic Partnership”. Crafted in the context of the first bi-regional Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro (Brazil) in 1999, the concept, spirit and details of this agreement have ruled over all the 5 
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agreements and conduct between the two blocs.
3 Major decisions are made in those biannual 
summits, which have been held alternatively in Latin America and European capitals (sometimes 
coinciding  with  the  EU  rotating  presidency),
4  and  are  attended  by  all  member  states’ 
representatives at both sides of the Atlantic at the highest level of prime ministers, ministers of 
foreign  affairs,  and  other  representatives  of  the  Latin  American  (and  Caribbean)  countries. 
Gatherings were held in Rio de Janeiro (1999), Madrid (2002),
5 Guadalajara (2004),
6 Vienna 
(2006),
7 and Lima, Peru (2008).
8 The latest summit took place in May of 2010 in Madrid 
9 and 
the next is scheduled to be held in Santiago de Chile in January of 2013.
10   
In addition to this decision-making framework, during those years, when the EU-LA-
Caribbean summit does not take place, another forum convenes in the form of a meeting between 
the  EU  and  the  Rio  Group,  composed  of  ministerial  representatives  of  Latin  American  and 
Caribbean countries. The most recent was the EU-Río Group Ministerial Meeting
11 that took 
place in Prague in 2009. 
 The  two  regions  are  in  fact  the  most  “natural  allies”  of  the  planet  (along  the  links 
between the United States/Canada and Europe itself), bonded by solid cultural, historical, and 
economic ties. Politics is a dimension that remains under study, taking into account different 
interpretations of democracy and political approaches. In the political reality, both regions co-
operate  very  closely  at  different  international  levels,  maintaining  an  intensive  “political 
dialogue” at all levels. They also interchange in many nuances across a wide regional level, 
evident  also  at  sub-regional  scenarios.  For  Brussels,  Latin  America  is  subdivided  along 
bureaucratic parameters, which respect the sub-regions as self-defined by Latin Americans. From 
this perspective, the EU (as a whole) deals with the entities known as Central America, the 
Andean  Community,  and  MERCOSUR,  as  well  as  with  the  Caribbean.  As  an  expansion  of 
special  bilateral  agreements  (i.e.  with  Mexico  and  Chile),  the  EU  has  been  negotiating 
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3 For an overall panorama, see the edited volume by Freres/Sanahuja (2006). 
 
4 For analytical essays on the summits: Chanona (2007) and Cieslik (2007). 
 
5 European Commission. EU-LAC Summit. Madrid 2002. 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/lac/madrid/dec_02_en.pdf. For a review of this summit, see: 
Sanahuja (2002, 2003).  
 
6 European Commission. EU-LAC Summit. Guadalajara 2004. 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/lac/guadalajara/decl_polit_final_en.pdf 
 
7 European Commission. EU-LAC Summit. Vienna, 2006. 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/lac/vienna/index_en.htm; For an evaluation: Domínguez 2007. 
 
8European Commission. EU-LAC Summit. Lima 2008. 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/lac/index_en.htm. For an update of the relations after this summit, 
see Kanner 2008. 
9 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/lac/index_en.htm; Madrid, 18 de mayo de 2010 9931/10 (Presse 131) VI 
Cumbre UE-ALC, Madrid, 18 de mayo de 2010. Declaración de Madrid 
http://www.eu2010.es/export/sites/presidencia/comun/descargas/Cumbre_UEALC/may18_madriddeclarat
ionES.pdf; For an evaluation: Malamud 2010, Nejamkis (2010) and Arenal/Sanahuja (2010).   
 
10 See website: http://www.gob.cl/cumbres/celac-ue/ 
 
11EU, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/la/riogroup_en.htm 
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agreements with single members of the existing blocs (Perú, Colombia, Brazil, and additional 
ones on the horizon). 
On a juridical level, the areas where the EU shows its preference in policy terms towards 
the  region  are  reflected  in  the  document  entitled  "EU-Latin  America:  Global  players  in 
Partnership  (2009).
12  This  “Intent  of  Action”  represents  an  update  to  the  previous 
Communication, "Stronger Partnership between the European Union and Latin America" (2005). 
13 In addition to traditional general themes and issues, the EU and Latin America engage in 
specific and crucial areas in the new century, i.a. macro economic and financial matters; the 
environment,  climate  change  and  energy;  science,  research  and  technology;  migration;  and, 
employment and social affairs. 
The perspective of the EU is clearly expressed in more concrete terms in the Regional 
Strategy Paper
14. As its name shows, it is the EU’s regulation that self-defines the policy and 
financial details towards Latin America, most specifically in the sensitive areas of economic and 
social development cooperation programs. As expanded in section below, Brussels has been 
channeling an impressive level of assistance
15 in excess of € 3 billion for the current seven-year 
period, beyond each EU member state maintaining its own development assistance programs, as 
well as NGOs. Spain has been heading the list as the major donors.
16 Additionally, the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) 
17 is entrusted with the potential use of € 2.8 billion.
18      
  Beyond  those  programs,  where  the  European  Commission  (and  now  the  European 
External Action Service) has a commanding role as major agent of the interests of the European 
Union, relations between the European Parliament and counterparts in Latin America (as well as 
with the inter-Latin American PARLATINO) have also increased in the last decade. Joint efforts 
are channeled through EUROLAT, a bi-regional body, meeting alternatively in Europa and Latin 
America. Their decisions have a great impact in reshaping programs crafted by the Commission, 
and ultimately approved by the Council (with the co-decision powers of the EU Parliament 
representing  a  dimension  to  reckon  with  in  the  future)  (.Sanahuja  2009;  Stavridis  2010, 
Fernández 2010). 
 
 
The economic dimension: trade, investment, aid 
 
The  economic  relationship  between  the  European  Union  and  Latin  America  can  be 
inspected  in  three  sectors:  trade,  investment  and  development  aid.  Each  one  shows  shows 
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12 EU, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/la/rsp/07_13_en.pdf 
 
13 EU, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/la/docs/com05_636_en.pdf 
 
14 EU, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/la/rsp/07_13_en.pdf 
 
15 EU, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/latin-america/index_en.htm 
 
16 For an evaluation of Spain’s assistance: Fernández Carcedo 2010.  
 
17 http://www.eib.org/projects/regions/ala/index.htm 
 
18 For an evaluation, see: Ayuso 2010. 
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interesting aspects confirming perceptions and offering backing evidence for the preferences of 
each part (CEPAL, 2009, 2010).  
In the first place, the overall pattern of the main trade partners of the EU for the period of 
2006 to 2011 shows a steady presence of some countries in the top 10 positions. The United 
States, China, Russia, Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, Japan, India, Brazil and South Korea. Of 
special importantce for this study is the role played by Brazil. Note the rise of the predominance 
of China in recent years. At the same time there has been a slight decrease of the United States 
operations (see Graphs # 1 and # 2). Regarding the specific exchanges with Latin America, 
records show that since 2002 the EU has shown a deficit in trade of goods, but after a bottom 
slump in 2008, figures of 2010 shows an improvement to €5.868 billion. (See Graph # 3).  
In terms of world percentage of trading with Latin America, figures are very modest. The 
EU’s exports to Latin America represent only 6.23 percent of total, while imports figures are 
similar  (6.02  percent)  (see  Table    #1  ).  By  sector,  the  exchange  between  Europa  and  Latin 
America reflects the strengths and needs of each partner. Europe sends to Latin America mainly 
manufactured goods, and Latin America sells the EU mostly natural resources products. (See 
Graph #4 ). 
  As  a  reflection  of  the  special  interest  of  the  European  Union  in  the  Latin  American 
economic, investment figures show enough evidence that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  has  continued  the  long  term  positive  trend  (reaching  150 
billion) (Graph #5). In recent years, this trend has even been faster than the global average trend. 
However, data shows that most of the inflow is concentrated in only a small number of countries. 
These  are  Brazil  (66  bn),  Mexico  (19bm),  Chile  (17bn),  Colombia  (13bn).  An  interesting 
dimension is the fact that the actual reinvestment of earnings have increased to 46%, confirming 
the European confidence in the progress of the Latin American economies. However, the bulk of 
FDI for the South America sub-region still goes to the natural resources sector, although Brazil is 
an exception. In Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean the majority of investments are in 
the service sector (53%) and manufacturing (40%). There is also investment in tourism and 
export of manufactured goods in the free zones. Overall, data shows that investment in South 
America  has  picked  up  after  the  crisis  of  2008,  while  in  Central  America  and  Mexico  has 
remained  steady.  However,  in  global  terms,  while  Europe  is  still  the  major  investor,  the 
European  economic  crisis  has  impacted  the  flowing  towards  Latin  America.  Spain,  a  major 
player, has diverted energies to other EU countries.    
FDI in medium and high tech sectors is increasing but is limited to Brazil and somewhat 
to Argentina and Mexico, and is still only at 36% (in Asia it is 80%). High tech investment is 
only 3%, but it is worth noting that the majority of the foreign investors in this sector are from 
Europe or the US. In sum, the EU remains the main investor in the region. Comparatively, 
percentages speak by themselves: the United States invested 18%, Japan 8%., and the EU around 
40%.  
In development aid, the EU (its 27 Member States and the EC institutions) is the major 
agent  in  Latin  America.
19  Spain  is  the  leader  in  this  modality.  In  global  figures,  Europe 
contributes with over $5.8 billion, of which $1.2 billion come from EU programs, and the rest 
from national Member States programs. Spain is the leader, contributing $1.5 billion, followed 
by Germany (1 billion) and France (800 million) (Table #2, Graphs #6, #7). The major thread for 
these operations is the economic and financial crisis that has forced most countries to cut budgets 
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19 For overall and detailed data of EU’s development aid, see:  
http://development.donoratlas.eu/Query3.aspx; For a detailed report by the EU Commission, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/files/publications/europeaid_annual_report_2011_en.pdf 
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and internal contributions to NGOs). On the negative side, one has to take into account the 
serious deterioration of European economies and the corresponding financial crisis. As a result of 
this, the EU Commission presented plans to reduce the funding for Latin American development 
projects. Part of the logic is to concentrate development cooperation in some specially needed 
countries, terminating as a result direct programs in 11 Latin American countries, still eligible for 
regional budgets.
20 Some EU Member States that have been hit more heavily (Spain in the lead, 
but also France and Italy) are at the same time identified as the most active in spearheading 
relations  with  Latin  America,  in  a  variety  of  sensitive  sectors.  Calls  for  austerity  measures 
decreed by international agencies and the EU itself have forced some national governments to 
execute spending cuts in easy-to-target areas, such is the case of foreign aid, slashed in half in 
certain countries.
 21 
 
II 
Subregional and special relations  
Central America 
 
The European Union and the Central American
22 countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama) have maintained a solid relationship for at least a 
quarter of a century, composed of a political dialogue, important development cooperation, and a 
favorable trade regime for both regions (Sanahuja, 2004, Roy ).  The political relationship stems 
from the implementation of the San José Dialogue in 1984, in an essentially context of internal 
armed conflicts, affecting most Central American countries during this period. Europe, with its 
experience in resolving centuries-old animosities, saw a golden opportunity in contributing to the 
pacification of the area. This challenge significantly was set in the backyard of the United States, 
in a dangerous era where the threat of a Marxist takeover of certain countries (Nicaragua, El 
Salvador)  was  more  than  a  hypothesis.  At  first,  the  U.S.  government  (especially  during  the 
Reagan administration) was reluctant to see the European involvement, but by the early 1990s 
the record was extremely positive. The Peace Accords of 1992 had a large impact from the 
European efforts. After a long period of cooperation, in June 2007 the EU and Central America 
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20 European Parliament. “EU must not slash development aid to Latin America, say MEPs” Plenary 
Session Development and Cooperation − 12-06-2012; 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20120612IPR46647/html/EU-must-not-slash-
development-aid-to-Latin-America-say-MEPs; for a description of EU’s development programs, see 
documentation: “Partners in Development”. 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/documents/178a_latinam_dev_coop_guide
_2010_en.pdf 
21 As a dramatic example, the projected budget of the Spanish government of €2.6 billion in 2011 was 
reduced to € 1.2 for 2012. Leading Spanish autonomic regions, such as the important case of Catalonia, 
have been forced to execute similar measures: from a budget of €49 million in 2010, funding was cut in 
half for 2011, and for 2012 was reduced to €15 million, a total reduction of 80%. Ironically, those 
governments are seeking the help of the EU, the entity that ordered Spain to reduce spending. 
22 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ca/index_en.htm 
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began negotiating an Association Agreement, using as a base the previous EU-Central America 
Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement of 2003.  
Since then, several stages of negotiations have taken place, although progress has been 
slow, due to difficulties in the area, challenging agreement on concrete common positions on 
regional integration. Beyond this, separate negotiations have taken place pertaining to the full 
participation of Panama in the process of integration, known as the System of Central American 
Integration (SICA).
23 Finally, as a result of the Madrid summit of 2010, Central America and the 
EU have found a nearly complete approach to completing their Association Agreement. In terms 
of financing for development cooperation, the Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013 shows the EU 
as  the  major  donor  to  the  area.  The  EU  is  also  the  second  major  trade  partner  for  Central 
America after the United States.
24  
The Andean Community 
The Andean Community
25 was founded in 1969 as a reformation of the Andean Pact. 
Today it has four members (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru), with the attitude of each 
towards the collective entity quite varied. The EU’s approach of political dialogue was initiated 
in 1996 with the Declaration of Rome (1996), and consolidated with a Political Dialogue and 
Cooperation Agreement (2003), which regulates the current relationship. As in the case of the 
other sub-blocs, the EU and the Andean Community also maintain institutional links within the 
framework of the forums between the EU and the Río Group.
 26  
   Negotiations for a complete Association Agreement failed in 2008, but were followed by 
a new approach, including an option to deal with individual countries - a reverse of past policy, 
in part due to the difficulties imposed by Bolivia, and also to comply with the requirements of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Negotiations subsequently began with Peru, Colombia 
and Ecuador in February 2009, and were successful in March 2010 in the cases of Peru and 
Colombia,  with  Ecuador  opting  for  a  delay.  This  tour  de  force  angered  Bolivia,  adding  its 
complaints to Venezuela’s decision to leave the Andean Community and join MERCOSUR. The 
forming of the Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of the Americas (ALBA, in Spanish), under 
the aegis of Venezuela was a major factor for the competition posed for the Andean group, 
which seemed at moments on the verge of dissolution. Meanwhile, Chile, formerly a member 
(and today only an Associate) decided to wait for better times. The fact that Perú and Colombia 
have also engaged in free trade arrangements with the United States only added more fuel to the 
fire. 
  
 
MERCOSUR 
 
As mentioned above, MERCOSUR
27 has been the EU’s favorite sub-regional bloc in 
Latin America. Founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción, it is today officially composed of 
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23 See website: http://www.sica.int/ 
24 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ca/rsp/07_13_en.pdf 
 
25 See description: http://www.comunidadandina.org/ 
 
26 EU, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/andean/index_en.htm 
 
27 Website: http://www.mercosur.int/ 
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four  countries  (Argentina,  Brazil,  Paraguay  and  Uruguay).  As  mentioned  above,  Venezuela 
joined the group, although full membership has been pending, because acceptance is subject to 
unanimity among members, and Paraguay did not endorse accession, questioning its democratic 
credentials.
28 Nonetheless, and in spite of the difficulties of the past in fulfilling its promise, and 
official aim, of building a common market, the EU has been supporting MERCOSUR via several 
initiatives, among them the Inter-Institutional Agreement to deliver technical and other support.
29 
As  early  as  1995,  the  EU  and  MERCOSUR  signed  an  Interregional  Framework 
Cooperation Agreement, effective in 1999. In 2001 both blocs opened negotiations for a much 
awaited Association Agreement based on the usual three pillars for this kind of relations between 
the EU and Latin American groupings: political dialogue, cooperation and a free trade area. 
However, negotiations were suspended in 2004 because fundamental differences existed in the 
sensitive realm of trade. The other issues continued to be advanced, and at the EU-LA Summit 
(held  in  Lima  in  2008)  new  areas  were  added  to  the  relationship:  science  and  technology, 
infrastructure and the trendy issue of renewable energy.
30 
At the Madrid summit of May 2010 considerable progress in the negotiations towards a 
much desired Association Agreement were announced, that would ideally lead to a free trade 
area. The MERCOSUR decision of August of 2010 to complete the requirements of a customs 
union reopened the path towards that end.
31 A new round of negotiation took place in November 
of 2011. It has been expected that an agreement would be reached on time for the January 2013 
summit.  However,  two  crucial  details  continue  to  be  a  major  obstacle  for  progress  in  the 
negotiations. Both regions coincide in identifying their sensitive sectors. For the EU the prime 
objective  is  the  exporting  of  manufactured  goods,  a  sector  that  is  labeled  as  protective  by 
MERCOSUR.  The  region  primes  the  exports  of  its  food  products,  while  the  EU  insists  in 
protecting its territory and production via the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).      
Nonetheless, the leading role of MERCOSUR in EU relations with Latin America is 
shown by the fact that in 2009, EU-MERCOSUR trade equaled all the EU figures with the rest of 
the Latin America grouping. The year before, the EU was MERCOSUR's first trading partner, 
with 20.7% of total trade of the southern bloc. By the end of the decade, the EU was the already 
the  largest  investor  in  MERCOSUR.  Globally,  the  subregion  ranked  8th  among  EU  trading 
partners, with 2.7% of total EU trade. 
Development assistance from the EU to Mercosur is provided via its 2007-2013 Regional 
Program,  which  was  adopted  in  2007  within  the  context  of  the  Regional  Strategy  for 
MERCOSUR. This program sets aside €50 million for projects in the main areas of cooperation: 
institutional  strengthening,  preparing  for  implementation  of  the  Association  Agreement,  and 
participation of civil society. The record shows that the EU is the major donor of assistance to 
MERCOSUR. 
As mentioned above, MERCOSUR has witnessed a spectacular increase of European 
investments, surpassing the historical supremacy role of the United States. Key sectors such as 
banking,  telecommunications,  and  water  supply  have  become  a  European  terrain.  However, 
recent confrontations with some governments (as it is the case in other subregions, with Bolivia 
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28 However, the dismissal of president Fernando Lugo in June of 2012 precipitated the suspension of 
Paraguay as member of MERCOSUR, making accession effective. 
   
29 For a description of EU’s relations with the bloc: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/mercosur/index_en.htm 
 
30 For a review of the relationship, see Bizzozero 2010.  
 
31 For a pre-summit evaluation, see Peña 2010.  
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and Venezuela) have led to nationalization processes (the latest involved the oil conglomerate 
YPF-REPSOL) that have placed doubts on future involvement of European firms due to the 
perceived lack of legal security.          
 
 
Specials relationships 
 
Respectful of individual linkages enjoyed by some Latin American countries with the 
EU, the latter has signed special agreements with certain states that do not belong to any of the 
Latin  American  sub-groupings,  or  are  partners  of  other  regional  networks  beyond  the  Latin 
American territory. These are the cases of Mexico and Chile, which enjoy special free trade 
agreements with the EU. Since their inception, EU trade with these two countries has increased 
more than 100%.   
As mentioned earlier, Chile was a member of the Andean Community in the past, but 
abandoned this membership during the years of military dictatorship under General Pinochet. 
With the return to democracy, Chile proceeded to develop one of the most open economies, 
including free trade agreements with many countries and regions of the world, such as the United 
States and the EU.  
In December 1990, the EU signed a first Framework Co-operation to restore political 
relations as a bloc with Chile. This Agreement was replaced in June 1996 by another Framework 
Cooperation  Agreement,  with  the  primary  objective  to  establish  a  political  and  economic 
association.  The  EU  and  Chile  later  negotiated  and  signed  an  Association  Agreement  in 
2002,
32 effective  as  of  2005,  covering  fundamental  areas  in  the  traditional  trio  formed  by 
political, commercial and development assistance issues. Additionally, the EU and Chile signed 
an Agreement on Scientific and technological Cooperation in 2002. In 2005 the two parties 
adopted a Horizontal Agreement on air transport - all of which having had a considerable impact 
on trade and development cooperation
33 
Mexico for its part for two decades has enjoyed membership in the North American Free 
Trade  Area  (NAFTA)  with  the  United  States  and  Canada.  In  1997,  Mexico  also  signed  a 
partnership  agreement  with  the  EU,  the  Economic  Partnership,  Political  Coordination  and 
Cooperation  Agreement
34.  It  is  the  commitment  that  governs  all  sectors  of  the  relationship 
between the two parties, including sensitive topics such as democracy and human rights – two 
areas  which  Mexico  was  earlier  reluctant  to  touch.  On  the  purely  commercial  level,  the 
agreement  means  that  the  establishment  of  a  free  trade  area  also  fostered  an  increase  in 
investments.  Furthermore  social  cohesion,  a  crucial  area  in  any  Latin  American  country, 
represents an integral part of these processes.
35 
Although considered to be outside the strictly Latin American context, reference should 
be made to the special relations between the EU and the Caribbean. Mostly dotted by former 
British  colonies,  in  addition  to  independent  and  semi-colonial  islands  of  Dutch  and  French 
origin,  the  majority  of  the  autonomous  states  are  members  of  the  Caribbean  Community 
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32http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/1696&format=HTML&aged=0&langua
ge=en&guiLanguage=en 
 
33 http://eeas.europa.eu/chile/csp/07_13_en.pdf 
 
34 http://eeas.europa.eu/mexico/index_en.htm; http://eeas.europa.eu/mexico/docs/com08_447_en.pdf 
 
35 For a revision of this experience, see Sanahuja 1998. 
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(CARICOM). Founded partially under the inspiration of institutional example of the EU, the 
path towards true integration has been slow. CARIFORUM is the framework established with 
the support of the EU as way of coordinating the Caribbean portion of benefits for the Africa, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of 76 nations, receiving benefits originally under the Lomé 
Convention, and now the Cotonou Agreement. 
36 
In this setting, the Dominican Republic (endorsed by Spain), and Haiti (sponsored by 
France) have been added. Cuba, which is the only Latin American country with no established 
cooperation or trade agreement, was the subject of a critical Common Position imposed by the 
EU in 1996. However, as a measure to ease the way towards a more fluid relationship, Cuba 
became a member of the Africa-Caribbean Pacific (ACP) framework, pending its application to 
sign  the  Cotonou  Agreement  –  which  never  took  place  due  to  the  confrontations  between 
Brussels  and  Havana  (Roy  2009).  The  relationship  with  Cuba  has  been  one  of  the  areas  of 
disagreement between some of the earlier EU member states and the new member states after the 
2004 enlargement. While Spain, due to its historical special relationship with Cuba, has a record 
of maintaining solid links with its former colony, no matter who has been in power in either 
country, some new members of the EU, formerly under Communist domination, have shown a 
hard line attitude, making a full normalization of relations difficult.             
 
 
III 
 
Clouds, uncertainties and hope 
 
As the above analysis has revealed, one of the EU’s main objectives in its involvement in 
Latin America has historically been the expectation of spreading European values, as understood 
after World War II (Roy-Domínguez 2005, 2008, 2010). European model of integration, as a 
base for economic and social progress and political reconciliation, has been an integral part of 
the  EU  ideals  that  have  been  shared  with  Latin  American  countries.  But  on  balance  EU 
institutions have indications, beyond a certain degree of satisfaction, to also feel considerable 
frustration regarding the accomplishments of regional integration. 
One wonders why the Latin American systems of integration lag so much behind the 
point of reference (or the outright model) of the European Union. Why has that region of the 
world that is closest to Europe in history and cultural origin, not succeeded in adopting the 
European  path,  in  spite  of  the  considerable  financial  efforts  dedicated  by  Brussels  to  Latin 
America? Why is there a recurring contrast between official declarations vouching for the last 
quarter century to pursue the goal of integration similar to the EU, and the empirical reality, 
which is riddled with shortcomings and failure? What do Latin American leaders mean when 
they declare that the region needs “its own model of integration”, sidelining the influence of the 
EU precedent? What is this elusive Latin American alternative? It is time then for offering some 
tentative explanations.  
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36 European Commission. Relations with the Caribbean. 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries/eucaribbean_en.cfm?CFID=1306536&CF
TOKEN=53102587&jsessionid=2430648ae4ad105f444d;  
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Areas of concern  
 
In contrast with the historical tensions between the United States and Latin America, to a 
great extend caused by proximity, the relationship with Europe should be in principle different in 
this sense. However, the changing nature of planetary links inserts in the EU-LA relationship 
variations of the traditional sources of friction. One is standard migration; the other is drug and 
human  trafficking.  An  additional  novel  source  of  concern  is  arms  trading.  In  a  way,  these 
apparently separated areas are connected within a new and expanded concept of security, beyond 
the traditional war and strategic confines.  
During the first decade of this century, European interests for security problems in Latin 
America  still  ranked  very  low  (Felmann,  2006).  Some  think-tanks  and  defense  observers 
(especially in Spain) were at the origin of a trend of paying attention to the linkages between 
governability and security (Sepúlveda, 2005). The spillover to other countries of the terrorist and 
narco-trafficking  problems  in  Colombia  worried  researchers.  The  collective  EU  structure 
expressed  opposition  to  the  US  strategy  under  the  “Plan  Colombia”,  which  was  branded  as 
militaristic (Roy, 2001). The Venezuela connection caught the attention of governments and 
researchers.  The  incomplete  regional  integration  plans  in  Latin  America  were  perceived  as 
potential victims of the intra-Latin American conflicts in the making (Malamud, 2005b). 
It  was  in  the  second  part  of  the  decade  that  Spanish  researchers,  pushed  by  funding 
coming from the Defense ministry, began to focus closer on the military equipment build-up in 
Latin American armed forces. Ironically, companies in Spain and other European countries were 
contributing to this trend, competing among themselves and with the United States in supplying 
modern weapons to an array of governments of all sorts of ideological inclinations (Ministerio de 
Defensa,  2009,  2010;  Fuente  Cobo,  2010).  Observers  has  debated  if  this  rearmament,  a 
customary arms race, or a traditional standard modest renovation of the existing old equipment. 
In any event, two novelties in this overall phenomenon have attracted the attention of analysts. 
On the one hand, the arms-buying operations offer the paradox that in spite of the increase in 
volume of acquisitions of weapons, Latin America still ranks lower than other regions in the 
world regarding percentage of the government expenditure on military and defense projects (1.4 
percent). On the other hand, another interesting factor is the fact that left-leaning governments 
have joined the ranks of an arms-acquiring activity, something that in the past they criticized as 
typical of right wing dictatorships (Malamud/García Encina, 2006; Alda Mejías, 2010).  
Among the active buyers, some countries are undisputed leaders. The first is Venezuela. 
President Chávez has been acting independently in the building of its armed forces, converted to 
“revolutionaries”. He also faces the potential for confrontation because of disagreements with 
neighboring Colombia, over controversies around alleged covering up for the narco-trafficking 
activities of the FARC or simple mundane rivalries. It is on the record that Venezuela has been 
vividly opposed to the Plan Colombia, lately reformatted into the Patriot Plan.  
In  this  and  a  wider  context,  the  Venezuelan  government  has  been  searching  for 
alternative supplies. The favored new beneficiaries have been Russia and China. When the sale 
of Spanish EADS-CASA transport planes was cancelled (under the pressure from the United 
States,  claiming  a  potential  double  use  of  technology)  Chávez  looked  again  at  the  Russian 
alternative. Although Chávez’s collaboration with Iran remains a project in the making, concerns 
have  been  raised  about  the  potential  use  of  enriched  uranium  as  base  for  the  production  of 
nuclear weapons. An additional item of concern is the decision to insert the armed forces in the 
process of regional integration in South America and the Caribbean, a novelty in a region where 
the projects and existing organizations had been concerned solely with free trade.  
Organized crime and uncontrolled migration (with poverty as a reason behind) are some 
of  the  factors  that  threaten  some  European  social  scenarios  and  foreign  investment  in  Latin 14 
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America. Inter-continental human transfer trends reversed a historical pattern as Latin American 
migration to the old continent spectacularly increased, as an alternative to the attraction of the 
United States. A novel trend regarding emigration paradoxically took the form of obstacles for 
the return of unemployed immigrants who suffered the impact of the economic crisis in Europe. 
Pressed by endemic lack of opportunities, emigration to Europe did not stop completely. In spite 
of the job scarcity, the new immigrants at first resisted the offer (back by monetary incentives 
and  compensation)  to  leave  and  return  to  their  native  countries.  The  lowering  of  income 
produced by jobs held by undocumented immigrants and the underground economy generated a 
dangerous  boomerang  effect.  The  decrease  of  the  value  of  remittances  hit  the  local  Latin 
American  economies  with  unexpected  force.  In  many  countries  whole  families  and  entire 
communities had been surviving on transfers from relatives residing and working in Europe. The 
economic crisis obliterated a substantial part of this support. 
At the same time, European investments were faced with demands for traditional altruism 
(something that normally is not expected from U.S. investments), as a sort of non-governmental 
additional development aid to make up for local shortcomings (poverty, inequality, and sheer 
underdevelopment). This dilemma had to be reconciled with self-interest which sought political 
and  legal  stability,  necessary  to  protect  European  interests  in  Latin  America.  Direct  threats 
against investment occupied top place in the European agenda. As a result, agenda of the EU-LA 
summit to take place in 2012 in Chile included special attention to this aspect. 
 
 
The Nation and the State 
     
  The  main  obstacle  for  the  development  of  an  ambitious  regional  integration  entity 
mirroring the model of the EU is the unfinished task of consolidating a polity that matches the 
pressure of meeting the needs of national identity. National integration still takes precedent over 
continental  cohesion.  For  this  reason  a  limited  number  of  intellectuals  and  technocrats  have 
found it very difficult to convince elites and society of the benefits proposed by what appears to 
be a “loss” of national personality. 
Under  these  circumstances,  the  inability  of  certain  governments  to  cope  with  the 
pressures  of  instability,  corruption,  poverty,  inequality,  and  endemic  criminality  present 
endogenous threats to achieving regional integration in Latin America. The prospects of the 
appearance of “failed states” are daunting: The usual conclusion is that the “state” has failed the 
citizens in providing for basic services and protection. The monopoly of economic control and 
force  has  been  translated  in  Latin  America  as  a  guarantee  for  the  continuation  of  income 
disparities and social exclusion, as well as outright discrimination for reasons of race, gender, 
and  economic  level.  Personal  security  has  been  translated  into  repression.  Human  rights  are 
reduced  to  the  maintenance  of  the  law  and  order  (although  crime  is  endemic).  Judicial  and 
legislative institutions are found to be weak and impotent. The few times when police and the 
armed forces are present, they serve to maintain the traditional structures where possibilities of 
change are few. It is then said that what has failed is the State. 
In  reality,  what  has  failed  is  actually  the  Nation.  The  nation-state,  as  a  European 
invention,  mostly  crafted  by  wars,  is  an  elusive  dream  in  Latin  America.  The  concept  of 
nationality based on will, option, and a desire towards the future (as in the French and U.S. 
traditions)  has  been  a  nice  paper  project,  never  accomplished.  Paradoxically,  an  unfinished 
nation  could  be  the  ideal  base  for  an  effective  regional  entity,  in  which  the  displaced  and 
marginalized people could identify themselves.  
Emigration has recently built an identity (latinoamericano) that does not exist in the 
normal existence of each of these countries. The use of this term is further reinforced when the 15 
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phenomenon of immigration is set in the domestic context of the United States. “Hispanic” and 
“Latino” are words originating from the experience of a new life in the United States. Ironically, 
the force of migration could manage to produce, what treaties and declarations have failed to 
accomplish. However, for that project to be successful, the current and future regional integration 
schemes would have to complete the magic four freedoms of a common market, as in the EU: 
Free trade and a customs union would have to be completed, with full freedom of movement of 
capital and services. But the key for a full integration is the free mobility of labor, something that 
the existing integration and economic cooperation networks do not seem to be able to fully 
contemplate.              
  Latin America has lacked a Jean Monnet, who could sell a brilliant idea to be transformed 
into  a  “bold  step”,  as  in  the  initial  phase  of  the  EU.  Well-intentioned,  some  of  the  most 
influential pensadores seldom managed to infiltrate the centers of power, still obsessed by the 
attraction  of  domestic  control  and  the  imitation  of  the  model  of  the  combination  of  prócer, 
“founder” and “father of the land”, sometimes fusing with the concept of the nation, with semi-
religious connotations, as in the notorious cases of Bolívar and, most specifically, Cuba’s José 
Martí. Some recent attempts to give rise to such “technical” person have been detected in the 
work of technocrats behind the scene, though their decisive impact has been limited. 
  As a result, the overwhelming centrality of the presidential figure in the Latin American 
nation-states imposes a formidable obstacle towards a move to a sharing of sovereignty. The 
recent appearance of neo-populist regimes (a trade mark of the history of Latin America) is not 
helping  in  taming  this  endemic  regional  characteristic.  Moreover,  the  scarcity  of  economic 
capital resources, and the deficient use of natural resources convert the pooling of products into a 
cumbersome  task,  subjected  to  a  lack  of  confidence  and  competition  to  protect  scarce  own 
resources. As a result of national competition the building of joint institutions, distrusted as new 
competing bureaucracies, is a never-ending process. Finally, the pressure posed by invitations to 
sign flat and direct individual trade agreements with the United States makes supranational Latin 
American integration appear as a competitor with uncertain advantages. However, there are other 
positive factors that make the pursuit of a Latin American path of integration viable and with a 
moderate prognosis for the future. 
 
 
A tortuous path towards integration. 
  
The endemic confrontations between France and Germany, and most of the European 
empires and modern countries, that led to the formation of the EU as a remedy, cannot be 
compared with the concrete number of wars involving some Latin American countries in 
historical events. Brazil, the largest nation-state, owes its independence not to an anti-colonial 
struggle, but to the abandonment of the Portuguese monarch, who ironically took refuge there 
after the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. The independence struggles in most of 
the rest of the Hispanic American area were initially resistance against the Napoleonic invasion 
of Spain. 
In theory, then, the comparatively pacific background in Latin America should result in a 
deeper integration, stronger than in Europe. In fact, war could not be used as a springboard for 
the foundation of integration schemes as it was in Europe. In sum, taking into account the 
European wars, Latin America lacks that “foundational justification”. However, other factors 
(geography, political resentment, concrete border disputes) have instead presented difficulties for 
the strengthening of regional projects.            
Recently, Latin American sectors that are skeptical to the deepening of the arrangements 
of economic cooperation, welcomed the endorsement of what they perceive as an ambivalent 16 
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European  example.  This  trend  stresses  the  negative  approach  towards  what  erroneously  is 
interpreted  as  “loss  of  sovereignty”  or  “cession  of  national  prerogatives.”  An  expression  in 
English, converted as the de facto official EU language (with the futile resistance of France), 
supplies a perfect illustration of its innate nature and its practical functioning: In being referred 
to  as  “pool”,  sovereignty  is  shared,  nor  ceded  or  lost.  These  two  wrong  accusations  are 
frequently  present  in  the  Latin  American  discourse  when  considering  the  benefits  and 
disadvantages of regional integration. Since a word like “pool” does not exist in Spanish, “shared 
sovereignty” conveys an incorrectly understood concept, as do equivalent expressions that try to 
fill the linguistic vacuum, revealing more a conceptual shortcoming, than a linguistic deficiency: 
hence the European model, in essence, fails in its effective cognitive projection all over the 
Americas (Serbín, 2010). 
What is missing in Latin America is “political commitment” for integration. Without it, 
there is no effective regional integration. In all the effective stages of the EU, the commitment 
rendered by the political leadership has been notable. In a way, this requirement mirrors the 
mandate of Jean Monnet that “nothing is possible without the work of men”. After this, for the 
project to survive, it requires the existence of effective institutions, ruled by a juridical structure 
that is accepted by all. Monnet, following the inspiration of Swiss philosopher Frederick Amiel, 
added  that  “nothing  is  lasting  without  institutions”,  the  pillars  of  civilizations,  as  Monnet 
convinced  Robert  Schuman.  Political  commitment  backed  by  institutions  then  make  the 
implementation of common policies and actions possible. This crucial condition is missing in 
Latin America. 
An additional factor, close to the “presidential syndrome”, and necessary to explain the 
difficulties of the advancement of systems for Latin American integration, is the lack of juridical 
respect for norms and codes. This is a paradoxical phenomenon in a subcontinent obsessed with 
the codification in the tradition of Roman and Napoleonic laws, bestowed by Spain. But is also 
certain that the enshrining of presidential decisions sideline stipulations that have been accepted, 
as well as the basic principles of international norms. From the speed used to announce the new 
alliances and frameworks, to the rush to terminate commitments subject to international treaties 
(such as the withdrawal of Venezuela from the Andean Community), the current panorama is 
truly disappointing, if not alarming. 
The  rise  of  the  Community  of  South  American  Nations,  later  re-baptized  as  South 
American  Union  (UNASUR)
  has  not  advanced  to  the  level  of  expectations  and  grandiose 
declarations  to  date.
    Nonetheless,  optimistic  analyses  consider  that  the  process  still  has  an 
ambitious potential of potentially producing an entity, which follows the effective path of the EU 
(Peña, 2009). The key of this assessment is the leading role played by Brazil. Serious political 
incidents in some countries have tested the efficacy of the organization.           
The Latin American process of integration has been more inclined to make spectacular 
announcements of foundation of new entities. The latest addition (on top of the birth of 
UNASUR) has been the Bolivarian Alternative of the Americas (ALBA), later renamed as the 
Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of Our America, as founded by Venezuela to compete with 
the remains of the US-dominated FTAA.
37 Ironically, ALBA shows an innovative feature in its 
geographical structure. While the rest of the experiments and realities in regional integration and 
cooperation share a common geographical linkage (South America, Andes, Central America, the 
Caribbean basin, etc,.), ALBA is the only entity in which not a single member share any border 
with any other partner. Contiguity does not seem to be a requirement. 
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Moreover, another attempt to create a new framework for regional cooperation and 
integration took the form of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), 
38composed of all the Latin American and Caribbean nations. Its purpose is to offer a common 
front to discuss shared issues and serve as a forum for resolving difficulties. Observers have 
pointed out that it is like an Organization of American States (OAS)… without the United States 
and Canada. Founded in Mexico under then auspices of the Mexican government, its next 
summit is scheduled for Chile, which holds the rotating presidency, when the organization will 
be run by Cuba, the only country in Latin America and the Caribbean that does not have a full 
liberal democracy.  
Observers have noted that the generalized use of the word “integration” to refer to all 
these experiments and entities does not correspond with the clear aim and agenda of the 
organization in question. “Integration” does not seem to match the process offered by Béla 
Balassa in which systems scale steps from a free trade area to a customs union and the form a 
common market, with the expectation of crafting an economic union and ultimately a political 
common entity. Some of the entities explicitly preclude this inference by stating in its title the 
label “free trade” (NAFTA). The umbrella word use leads to confusion: Community (Andean, 
CARICOM), Alliance (Bolivarian), Union (UNASUR), Common Market (Mercosur), and even 
System (Central America).                    
Moreover, in all of these experiments there is a formidable resistance to the consolidation 
of independent institutions. Claiming that these entities, as set in the past, lacking budgets and 
authority, were the culprits of past failures, the process was left in the hands of a Latin American 
leadership consumed by a fever for “summitry”, although this trend is not exclusive of Latin 
America but seems to be the norm of governance in the multipolar world. The result has 
frequently been a string of media declarations, publicity-grabbing headlines, grasping for air to 
breathe, with no time to evaluate between one announcement of a virtual scheme, and the next 
similar event. 
  It all depends on the political will of the diverse leadership of the Latin American 
countries, and most especially in the Andean region, where the tenuous group (once mirroring 
the model of the EU on paper) will go. Some countries seem more inclined to opt for a free trade 
pact with Washington, questioning the validity of the deepening of indigenous blocs. Faced with 
the choice of only one wish offered by a genie, it is reasonable to predict that these countries 
would choose a better deal with Washington, than opting for the uncertainty of a regional pact. 
The latest experiment of a “escape” from the traditional blocs is the formation of the so-called 
Pacific Alliance, the new conglomerate founded by fours Latin American countries with shores 
on the Pacific Ocean (Mexico, Colombia, Perú and Chile), with other expressing interest in 
joining. 
39   
The conditional backing of Europe may run a similar fate. Threats of Bolivia to leave the 
Andean  group,  following  the  path  of  Venezuela,  have  been  raised  in  recent  years.  The 
radicalization and nationalization process exercised by Chávez has added more questions than 
answers for the reinvigoration of MERCOSUR. Across the pond, facing the disintegration of the 
Andean Community and the instability of MERCOSUR, Brussels seems to have exhausted its 
energies for pushing veritable integration. As mentioned above, it is not surprising then that the 
EU  has  crafted  a  strategic  partnership  with  Brazil,  and  offered  separate  deals  to  Perú  and 
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38 For a description:  http://www.parlatino.org/en/proyecto-de-la-celac.html 
 
39Miguel González, “La Alianza del Pacífico echa a andar”, El País, 7 junio 2012. 
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/06/06/actualidad/1339006403_059797.html 
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Colombia. This trend was unthinkable a decade ago, when the EU was still adamant in expecting 
the subregional blocs to be able to operate with a complete customs union structure. In turn, 
several European governments have been re-evaluating their global relationship with a Latin 
America. This is an entity that has showed evidence that in reality does not exist as a bloc, 
making bilateral approaches a must (Malamud, 2004b; Arenal, 2009). It is safe to say that the 
subtle, and then clear shift to a bilateral approach has not been caused directly by a change of 
philosophy in Brussels, but by the force of the arguments posed by the internal crisis of the 
Andean Community. It remains to be seen if this new approach will be applied to MERCOSUR. 
For the moment, the EU still continues officially with the bloc-to-bloc strategy, although the 
special move towards Brazil should be a subject of scrutiny (Arenal, 2010).  
Other  obstacles  make  the  EU-LA  front  difficult.  On  the  one  hand,  the  EU  resists 
reforming the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). That move would open its market to Latin 
American  products,  which  are  still  subject  to  quotas  and  quality  limitations.  Pressed  by  the 
serious  scenario  financial  crisis,  Europe  has  recently  also  attracted  the  irritation  of  Latin 
American  governments  and  societies  for  restricting  immigration,  following  the  pressures  of 
economic deterioration and the rise of unemployment in Europe. The need to replenish its aging 
populations with new blood, provided by immigration, has been neutralized by the arguments 
posed  by  the  financial  crisis,  which  has  affected  some  sectors  (construction,  low  level 
commerce)  traditionally  serviced  by  immigrants.  Facing  huge  payments  of  unemployment 
subsidies,  some  countries  (especially  Spain)  have  opted  for  sponsoring  repatriation  of  idle 
immigrants. 
On the other hand, many Latin American countries resist to liberalizing their economies 
(cases of MERCOSUR and Central America) to the level of European expectations, in specific 
fields. At the same time, they do not meet the request of the EU for the formation of effective 
harmonization of tariffs. However, the most daunting obstacle for progress and regional 
integration is the endemic level of poverty and inequality, the worst in the world. Social 
exclusion and discrimination fuel the rise of criminality, affecting all sectors of the societies, 
which in turn advocate the establishment of authoritarian regimes. The alternative is then the rise 
of populist regimes, usually not inclined to market-oriented regional integration experiments. 
Hence, the appearance of the ALBA, reduced to be a populist temptation subject to the whims of 
Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, for as long as he can use the oil largesse as a political weapon.              
      
 
 
IV 
 
Conclusion 
 
  Latin America has been caught between, on the one hand, its ambivalent path towards 
regional integration following its traditional framework and, on the other hand, the attraction of 
EU influence. Another challenge was added in the form of the “new regionalism”, a trend in 
which the performance of Latin America has been mixed.
40 However, the experience shows 
enough  positive  signs.  The  current  third  wave  of  regional  integration  in  Latin  America  is 
dominated by a variety of options for the insertion in markets, which can be used simultaneously 
and not exclusively, with mutual benefits (Peña 2009b). The prevailing dissatisfaction with the 
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40 As samples of practical analysis, see: Baier 2006, 2007; De Lombarde  2009; de la Reza 2010, 
Sanahuja 2007. 
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existing sub-blocs may lead to different scenarios. The first is to keep on acting as usual by 
inertia; the second is the perennial temptation of opting for a tabula rasa.  
  According to some Latin American voices, there is a third way. It is based on learning 
from all the experiences and applying them to new entities, such as UNASUR.
41 Instead of 
getting rid of all accumulated experience, priority should be given to regional integration as 
stability, and the creation of an autochthonous trade mark, combined with the acceptance of what 
is becoming the trend in Europe, the so-called variable geometry. At all times, there is a need to 
accept the centrality of agreements to be implemented and respected, with a will to change 
accordingly, and to adapt to the new circumstances. However, while populist temptations have 
been spreading and the demands for a hard line on security are growing, the protests against 
inequality, the pressure for uncontrolled mobility could become an integral part of an agenda 
impossible to meet. 
In conclusion then, the EU model is still valid to a certain extent in this context. In the 
last decade, the survival of the original essential European project was based on learning from 
past mistakes, and adapting the new bold, proposed frameworks to new circumstances. Perhaps 
the  latest  of  these  self-corrections  has  been  the  reform  process  of  the  institutions  through 
successive treaties, and the return to the slow, moderate method after the more ambitious option 
of a “constitution” failed. In this case, Europe has not fallen into the trap to either start from 
scratch, or to leave the task to inertia. Latin America may adopt some of this experience to 
redress its own path of integration. 
However, a consensus of a conglomerate of observers, representing the most active and 
influential Latin American and Spanish think tanks, have endorsed the synthetic analysis of a 
handful of Spanish experts under the sponsorship of government agencies (Instituto Cervantes, 
2010). The conclusion was that the balance of EU-Latin America relations is a mix of successes 
and failures: Advances in the political dialogue are counteracted by shortcomings in the global 
strategy. The reason for this is that general plans are still anchored in arguments prevalent in the 
90s. The so-called “open regionalism” is seen as outdated. But blame is placed on both sides of 
the equation: the Latin American front lacks clearly shared ideas. While the two main policy 
priorities continue to be regional integration and social cohesion, insistence on integration has 
diminished  and  needs  to  be  reshaped  or  substituted  by  a  bilateral  strategy.  Proposals  for  a 
deepening of this relationship, bordering the signing of a free trade area between the two regions 
seldom go beyond the theoretical drawings (Peels, 2008).   
The fact is that the new times are dominated by “post-liberal” winds. In consequence, 
programs have to adapt to this new climate (Arenal 2010a). As a mechanism to correct what is 
considered  as  a  faulty  process  is  the  adoption  of  concrete  objectives,  feasible  for  effective 
implementation.  Priority  areas  are:  better  connectivity  of  the  region,  support  for  permanent 
employment, policies to adapt to effects of climate change, and a solid educational strategy 
(Alonso 2010).  Consensus exists on the argument that social cohesion must be at the front of the 
bi-regional agenda, while the dispersion of the myriad of programs does not contribute to its 
accomplishment.  The  documents  elaborated  by  EU  institutions  are  frequently  ignored  by 
Member States. Therefore, there is the need to reinforce the role of the summits in the political 
area. All leads to the targeting of national sovereignty as paramount of state policies. When 
facing  the  reality  that  some  Latin  America  governments  do  not  adapt  to  the  sub-regional 
framework, the bilateral approach is the right solution. While full democracy is a goal to be 
fostered, the existence of populist regimes with little respect for political civil rights, and lack of 
integration with neighbors leads to the convenience of dealing with them separately (Mangas, 
2010). 
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41 For a critical in depth review of the prospects of MERCOSUR and UNASUR, see Mellado 2009. 20 
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In sum, there is a consensus based on the reality of an EU that has changed dramatically 
in the last decade, mostly due to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, but not exclusively caused by 
them. Latin America has also changed, surpassing the priority agenda dominated by transitions 
to democracy and its consolidation. Regional integration and the use of the EU model were 
found as panaceas to contribute to the advancement of Latin American societies. The traditional 
focus on the relations between the Latin America and Caribbean subregions with the EU needs to 
be reshaped. The summits must be redefined to deal with priority areas, to deliberate global 
issues, and open up new avenues for cooperation. The agenda of the summits must recognize that 
both regions are important global actors that need to foster triangular frameworks. Bilateral and 
sub-regional approaches must complement each other. Latin American development must be 
seen as beneficial for both parties. Sub-national actors must be incorporated into the agenda. 
Finally, some European states, Spain at the lead, must take a more aggressive and trend setting 
role.                                      
Regarding the overall impact that the 2004 widening of the EU has had on the European-
Latin American framework of relations, it is safe to say that there have been no signs of a 
decrease  in  the  volume  of  development  aid  to  Latin  America.  Internal  EU  declarations  and 
evaluations  during  the  last  decade  boasted  that  the  full  implementation  of  the  economic 
conditions  of  the  2004  enlargement  would  even  increase  the  commercial  links  between  the 
regions. 
In some areas, especially for political and ideological reasons, the role of some of the 
new  members  has  been  noticed,  more  as  an  opposition  to  specific  policies  endorsed  by  old 
timers, than as a positive contribution. This is the case with the relations with Cuba, an issue 
where  some  of  the  Central/Eastern  European  countries  (Poland  and  especially  the  Czech 
Republic) have been opposing the project of Spain for the reformatting of the Common Position 
imposed on Cuba in 1996. 
A future, step by step, enlargement of the EU (Croatia, Serbia, the rest of the Balkans, 
even Ukraine) is not expected to have a noticeable effect on the relations with Latin America. 
Budgetary lines for development assistance are guaranteed at least until 2013, and are expected 
to remain at a similar level. Trade will probably show an increase, especially if the association 
agreements with Central America and MERCOSUR are successful. The lowering of barriers for 
products  of  the  new  members  will  find  wider  markets  in  Latin  America.  The  hypothetical 
membership  of  Turkey  would  actually  mean  that  the  EU  had  changed  dramatically.  Then 
external relations might be seen in a different framework. However, the current existence of 
some Latin American states (such as the case of Brazil) as “emergent economies” and members 
of  the  BRIC  (Brazil,  Russia,  India,  China)  will  propel  the  sub-continent  to  a  new  level  of 
importance and attraction. European investors could then increase their involvement in Latin 
America to balance the new and aggressive insertion of China. By properly reacting to this 
challenge, the EU-Latin America relationship will definitely benefit.  
However,  as  mentioned  above  in  the  section  dedicated  to  economic  issues,  attention 
should  be  given  to  the  future  impact  of  the  financial  crisis.  The  fact  that  the  center  of  the 
financial storm is the banking industry, a leading field in European activities in Latin America, 
does not raise good prospects for an increase of European influence in Latin America. Only time 
will tell about the precise impact of the crisis and its legacy on EU-Latin America relations.       21 
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